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SUMMARY
The objective of this article is to describe and analyze how supporters of 
Israeli state policies have, since 2000, used legal forms often associated 
with efforts by the powerless to challenge entrenched power to instead 
turn those forms into tools of the powerful. This movement to use “law 
against the people” has come about largely as a reaction against attempts 
by activists to use courts and other legal fora to advance Palestinian rights. 
This unexpected boomerang effect provides reason for reflection on the 
role of law in the struggle for justice in Israel/Palestine, suggesting that 
law offers little promise of relief, at least when it is not integrated with and 
supported by a broader political strategy.
Key Words: Israel/Palestine; legal activism; human rights; international 
humanitarian law; lawyer.
1 This article is based on a lecture delivered September 10, 2015 at the Federal Fluminense University. 
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RESUMO
O objetivo deste artigo é descrever e analisar como apoiadores das políti-
cas estatais israelenses têm, desde 2000, usado formas jurídicas frequente-
mente associadas aos esforços dos destituídos de poder para desafiar o po-
der consolidado para, ao invés, torná-las ferramentas dos poderosos. Este 
movimento de uso da “lei contra o povo “surgiu em grande parte como 
uma reação contra as tentativas dos ativistas lançarem mão dos tribunais, 
e outros fóruns jurídicos, para a promoção dos direitos dos palestinos. 
Este inesperado efeito bumerangue fornece razões para reflexão sobre o 
papel do direito na luta pela justiça em Israel / Palestina, sugerindo que lei 
oferece pouca promessa de alívio, pelo menos quando não é integrada e 
apoiada por uma estratégia política mais ampla.
Palavras-chave: Israel / Palestina; ativismo legal; direitos humanos; direi-
to humanitário internacional; advogado
The main goal of this brief article is to describe and analyze how sup-
porters of Israeli state policies have, roughly since the year 2000 and the be-
ginning of the Second Intifada2, used legal forms traditionally thought of 
2 The term “intifada” means “uprising” or “overturning” in Arabic, and has been used to refer to two 
major waves of resistance to Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The First 
Intifada commenced in late 1987 and persisted until approximately 1993 before trailing off, and in-
volved mass demonstrations, tax resistance, strikes, and other forms of mostly unarmed resistance. 
The Second Intifada broke out in October 2000, sparked by a visit by Ariel Sharon, then candidate 
for Israeli prime minister, to the al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem, escorted by a heavily armed police 
contingent. Sharon’s visit was interpreted as a symbolic assertion of Israeli sovereignty over the 
mosque and surrounding area, Islam’s third most holy site. The al-Aksa Intifada, as it is also often 
called, quickly devolved into more militarized skirmishes, in which the Israeli army employed the 
fullness of its military arsenal against lightly armed Palestinian forces. The al-Aksa Intifada also 
witnessed the frequent resort by some Palestinian resistance groups of suicide bombings. This sec-
ond uprising was quelled and again petered out inconclusively by 2006.
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as tools of the powerless against entrenched power, to instead defend and 
advance those state policies – or in other words, to use “law against the peo-
ple.”3 I add “The Empire Strikes Back”4 part to the title because for the most 
part, Israel’s appropriation of what many may have thought were exclusively 
progressive legal instruments, doctrines, and organizational forms has been 
a response to Palestinians’ and others earlier attempts, beginning in the late 
seventies to early eighties, to deploy legal strategies to achieve Palestinian 
goals, particularly via the framework of human rights. In other words, what 
I am describing here was a primarily reaction to, or retaliation against, Pal-
estinians’ attempts to mobilize law to their benefit. Indeed, Israel’s support-
ers have coined a term, or at least borrowed one, to describe pro-Palestinian 
legal efforts. That term is “lawfare” – like warfare but replacing “war-“ with 
“law-“ – and that is how they see such efforts. We will return to this term 
and concept later. But that is why I describe it as “the empire striking back,” 
invoking, of course the famous Star Wars movie.
I. Introduction
This reference may seem comedic and therefore inappropriate. After all, 
there is much human suffering in the subject of this article, and by no means 
do I intend to make light of it. But there is, at least, an element of irony in the 
fact that we – and I mean by that, supporters of Palestinian rights, including 
me – were the ones to introduce law to our struggle. Now we find ourselves 
possibly being beaten at our own game.
This article can be seen as a sequel to two interventions I have offered in 
Brazil previously: a lecture I offered in 2010 in the annual meeting of the Bra-
zilian Anthropological Association in Belem and a subsequent article, both 
3 Here I must recognize my intellectual debt to Jeff Halper, and particularly his monograph War 
Against the People. While the topic of Halper’s study is different: that is, how Israeli employs “se-
curity politics” via the sale of arms and security technology to overcome its increasing isolation 
within the international community, essentially exporting means to wage “war against the people” 
globally, I was reading the book shortly before developing the thoughts reflected here and doubtless 
the title was in the back of my mind and led me to the parallel “law against the people.”
4 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080684/
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entitled “Violence’s Law”5; and a lecture I offered in several Brazilian uni-
versities in 2014 entitled “Entrancement, Engagement, Estrangement: Three 
Moods in the Legal Struggle for Justice in Palestine/Israel.”6 I begin by briefly 
recapping the arguments in these two interventions before turning to a brief 
sampling the work of three pro-Israel NGO’s: Shurat Hadin, or the Israel Law 
Center; Regavim, which means “small pieces of land”; and The Lawfare Proj-
ect. In my conclusion, I will suggest that the relative successes of these three 
groups in promoting Israeli state policies indicates that not only does law 
overwhelmingly favor power over justice, but that there are few or no “safe 
harbors” in procedural or substantive law that protect the powerless. Even the 
legal tools that have been specifically designed to protect the disenfranchised 
and downtrodden can be turned against them as weapons of oppression.
II. Violence’s Law
In Violence’s Law I reviewed Israel’s campaign, beginning in the year 
2000, to deliberately violate certain principles of international humanitarian 
law (IHL) in the hope that their practices would ultimately be accepted as new 
norms of customary international law. These violations generally involved the 
principle of distinction that is a key part of IHL, which limits the circumstances 
in which military forces may inflict harm on civilian bodies and property. The 
principle of distinction holds that militaries must only target combatants – oth-
er soldiers or civilians directly engaged in fighting – and may only attack other 
civilian persons or objects when doing so confers a distinct military advantage.
Israel’s purported innovations – such as the categorizing of civilian 
employees of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip as members of a “ter-
rorist organization,” and therefore combatants subject to attack – would, if 
accepted, expand the scope of permissible violence. This, I asserted, would 
transform IHL from a body of law restricting violence to a body of law autho-
rizing expanded violence – figuratively turning IHL on its head. 
5 “A Lei da Violência”. Antropolitica, n.30, 1sem.2011 
6 UFF-InEAC, UnB; PUC/Porto Alegre
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This article may be thought of as a sequel to Violence’s Law in sense that 
it puts Israel’s attempts to transform international humanitarian law (IHL) 
to expand, rather than limit, its uses of extreme military power in the Gaza 
Strip into a wider context, and shows it to be just one facet of a broader phe-
nomenon – that broader phenomenon being the inversion of law intended to 
protect the powerless in such a way as to authorize, expand, and legitimate 
the exercise of power.
III. Enchantment, Engagement, and Estrangement
This article is a sequel to the author’s Entrancement, Engagement, and 
Estrangement lecture in the sense that it helps to complete a historical chronol-
ogy. That lecture commenced with a discussion of a period of “enchantment” 
with law, covering, roughly, the 1980’s, in which Palestinians, along with 
many others in various parts of the world, experienced their “human rights 
moment.” This was a period in which human rights discourse became a prom-
inent feature of the Palestinian struggle for justice. In Palestine and elsewhere, 
this work carried forward by new organizational expression, the human rights 
non-governmental organization, or NGO. I described my experience working 
with al-Haq, the first Palestinian human rights NGO in the early eighties.7
I can testify personally to the palpable sense of excitement, purpose, and 
vast scope of possibilities for work and action held by Palestinian rights activ-
ists at the time. The emergence of al-Haq coincided with, and was local expres-
sion of worldwide rise of human rights discourse and attendant burgeoning of 
human rights NGO’s. Importantly, movement eventually generated – especial-
ly with the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada or uprising in late 1987 – a 
plethora of NGO’s promoting Palestinian human rights. Some were founded 
by and based in the Palestinian community, while others were based in Israel 
founded either by Palestinian citizens of that state or by Jewish Israelis.8
7 The organization was founded in 1979 in the West Bank town Ramallah, and continues in operation 
today. http://www.alhaq.org/
8 Adalah, for example, is an organization based within Israel that was founded in 1996 that continues 
in operation today. https://www.adalah.org/en
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Enchantment with the promise of law naturally led supporters of Pal-
estinian rights and Palestinians themselves to legal engagement, mainly in 
the form of human rights documentation and reporting, especially focusing 
on Israel’s violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), but also 
extending to litigation in courts both within Israel itself and in the OPTs. 
Lawyers challenged a range of Israeli practices, from home demolitions, tor-
ture, restrictions on movement, banishments, land confiscations, Israel’s 
separation wall, and more.
The upshot of both efforts, human rights documentation/reporting 
on the one hand, and litigation on the other hand, was the compilation of 
a voluminous record of Israeli violations, but virtually no alteration of Is-
raeli practices, which are, if anything, increasing in severity and mounting 
in frequency. Over the years, lawyers for Palestinian rights have achieved a 
few qualified victories. But for every “victory”, rights activists have suffered 
tens, if not scores, of losses. Particularly within Israel itself, unsuccessful 
challenges have often had the effect of legalizing those practices, at least for 
purposes of local law. Meanwhile, human rights NGO’s in the OPTs have 
been routinized, bureaucratized, and domesticated by support from external 
donors, such as the European Union, who are more concerned to monitor 
the performance of the Palestinian Authority than they are to contest Israeli 
human rights violations.9 Thus the current period of estrangement from law, 
and cynicism about human rights discourse.
Unfortunately, this article will demonstrate that the reasons for this 
cynicism and estrangement are not just the relative failures of the human 
rights complex seeking to vindicate Palestinian rights. Indeed, the picture 
is far worse – that is to say, the reasons for cynicism and estrangement far 
greater – when we add to the balance not just the losses suffered by sup-
porters of Palestinian rights and interests, but also the successes of those 
supporting Israeli state policies.
Let us now turn to those groups seeking to advance Israeli’s interests.
9 Lori Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine, 2013.
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IV. Shurat Hadin
Shurat Hadin (“the letter of the law”) was established in Tel Aviv in 2003. 
According to its own web site, the group is modeled after the highly respected 
Southern Poverty Law Center, which was founded in Montgomery Alabama in 
1971 with the objective of using civil litigation to combat racist organizations 
such as the Klu Klux Klan. Shurat Hadin describes itself as a legal defender of 
Israel and of Jewish interests internationally, and one of its slogans is that it is 
“bankrupting terror one lawsuit at a time.” It uses civil litigation (that is, not 
public prosecution) in courts throughout the world to combat “lawfare “- a 
term popularized among pro-Israel groups to depict Palestinians’ attempts to 
mobilize law to advance their rights – which they see as a perversion or ma-
nipulation of human rights law to attack Western democracies, of which Israel 
is one. Shurat Hadin frequently initiates suits in the United States, typically 
partnering with U.S. law firms who actually carry out the litigation.
Some of its legal actions seem, frankly, frivolous, and designed merely 
to harass and take a toll (in time and money for legal defense, in reputation, 
in emotions) on critics of Israel so as to deter them from future criticism. For 
example, Shurat Hadin sued former President Jimmy Carter and Simon and 
Shuster, the publishers of Carter’s 2006 book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, 
which argued that Israel would become an apartheid state if it did not grant 
freedom to Palestinians in the form of a sovereign state. The class action suit, 
brought in 2011 on behalf of five named plaintiffs and all purchasers of the 
book, alleged, in essence, that President Carter and Simon and Shuster had 
committed fraud against book purchasers in advertising the book as a work 
of non-fiction. The suit has, apparently, gone nowhere.
Sometimes its legal actions are very much more serious, such as a case 
that went to jury trial in early 2015 in federal court in New York. The suit had 
been filed against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO ) and Palestin-
ian Authority (PA) seeking damages for injuries and deaths to American citi-
zens caused by attacks during Second Intifada. The trial resulted in favorable 
verdict for the plaintiffs, and a judgment in amount of $655 million dollars was 
ordered. Interestingly, the court relied on a form of extraterritorial jurisdic-
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tion that had previously been used by left-liberal groups within the U.S. to sue 
former officials of right wing regimes in Latin America for torture and other 
crimes against their peoples. The right typically is suspicious of this kind of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction, because they fear reciprocal prosecutions of U.S. of-
ficials abroad for our endless meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. 
The jury verdict was overturned on jurisdictional grounds in August of 
2016 by a U.S. court of appeals. But even to achieve the jury trial verdict is 
a huge success, in striking contrast to attempted suits by Palestinians in US 
courts which have been thrown out of court at very early stages of litigation 
on procedural grounds. 
V. Regavim 
“Regavim” means “small bits of land,” a reference to a Zionist poem 
that promises the “redemption” of the land of Israel to Jewish sovereignty in 
piecemeal fashion.10 The organization was founded in Jerusalem in 2006, de-
scribing its objectives as protecting the lands of Israel from illegal encroach-
ment both within Israel itself and in the territories Israel has occupied since 
1967 (of course, without using that language). Regavim receives much of its 
funding from municipal councils of Israeli settlements and styles itself as a 
human rights NGO for Israeli settlers. 
According to Perugini and Gordon, Regavim “mirrors” – or one might 
say mimics – the human rights discourse, organizational form, methods of 
evidence gathering, and bodies of law (such as environmental law) of left-ori-
ented Israeli NGO’s such as Yesh Din, which works to end Israeli occupation 
of the OPTs, including, prominently, expansion of Israeli settlements there.11 
Regavim, in contrast, engages in advocacy and litigation to defend Israeli 
settler interests, both in the sense of fighting challenges to the legality of 
particular Israeli settlements (while all Israeli settlements in the OPTs are 
illegal under international law, according to the view of virtually the entire 
10 http://www.jns.org/latest-articles/2013/6/9/amid-global-focus-on-jewish-construction-ngo- 
counters-illegal-arab-building#.WUCGU7U_l-g=
11 Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate, 2015.
An t r o p o l í t i c A Revista Antropolítica, n. 42, Niterói, 1. sem. 2017
304
international community, Israel itself distinguishes between “legal” settle-
ments – those founded with direct support and authorization from the state 
– and “illegal” settlements – those founded through the private initiatives 
of typically religious nationalist Israeli settler individuals) and in encour-
aging Israeli authorities to demolish structures built by Palestinians with-
out permits and which are, nominally, illegal. Israeli authorities have com-
monly used zoning laws, environmental regulations, wildlife preservation 
programs, and other regulations to severely limit expansion of Palestinian 
residency, both within Israel itself and in the OPTs. Palestinians desperate 
to build space for growing families and economic enterprise have frequently 
been forced to build without official permits, putting them at risk, and not 
uncommonly the actuality, of home and other building demolitions.
Regavim has experienced consistent successes in defending the inter-
ests of settlers, gaining official recognition for settlements originally found-
ed without state approval, and pushing government agencies to enforced reg-
ulations limiting Palestinian land use. Indeed, in one case initiated against 
an “illegal” Israeli settlement by Yesh Din, that resulted in a court ruling 
in favor of the settlers, Regavim reportedly sent Yesh Din staff a bouquet of 
flowers in gratitude!12
VI. The Lawfare Project 
The Lawfare Project (TLP) was founded in New York City in 2010. It 
describes itself as the legal arm of the pro-Israel community and as a legal 
think tank that sponsors litigation and other legal action to protect civil and 
human rights of the “pro-human rights and counterterrorism communities.” 
As the name implies, its particular preoccupation is fighting what it calls 
“lawfare” – the abuse of law as a weapon of war against Western democracy. 
It pays to remember that TLP came into being in the aftermath of a series of 
legal actions against a number of Israeli officials for war crimes in Belgium, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.
12 Perugini and Gordon, ibid.
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The notion of “lawfare” is associated with the concept of asymmet-
ric warfare, and the argument that the current global war on terror entails 
unprecedented and distinct strategic challenges for Western democracies. 
Asymmetric warfare involves confrontation between the regular armed 
forces of states,and the irregular forces of terrorists. The forces are asym-
metrical not only in their scale – large state armies versus small bands of 
terrorists – but also in their respective tactics, weaponry, and adherence or 
non-adherence to prevailing norms and legal principles governing armed 
conflict. Armies are law-abiding, while terrorists are law-flouting, at least 
in conducting their own military operations. But they – terrorists and their 
sympathizers – are not above using law as a means to limit the combat ca-
pabilities of conventional armies, thus unfairly “weaponizing” law in the 
struggle against legitimate democratic governments.13 The Lawfare Project 
was founded, therefore, as a counterforce against efforts to shackle Western 
democracies – counting Israel, despite its geographic location, as one – in 
their unified fight against global terrorism.
TLP has engaged in a variety of actions, but devotes itself mostly to re-
search and briefings. For example, the group generated a legal analysis of the 
refusal of Kuwait Airways to transport Israeli nationals under U.S. anti-dis-
crimination law, which bars differential treatment based on such categories 
as ethnicity, race, or national origin, and then shared it with the U.S. Secre-
tary of Transportation. He, apparently adopting the project’s legal reasoning, 
ordered Kuwait Airways to abide by U.S. law or risk the termination of its 
leases at several U.S. airports. Kuwait Airways suspended its flights to the 
U.S. in response.14 
TLP also campaigned to prevent broadcasting by Hamas and Hizbol-
lah associated TV stations in the U.S., presenting domestic law enforcement 
13 The originator of this term was Major General Charles Dunlap, USAF. See Lawfare Today, http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5892&context=faculty_scholarship&-
sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2Fsearch%3Fq%3Dcharles%2520dun-
lap%2520lawfare%26pc%3Dcosp%26ptag%3DC1N0015D011214A316A5D3C6E%26form%3D-
CONBDF%26conlogo%3DCT3210127#search=%22charles%20dunlap%20lawfare%22
14 See http://thelawfareproject.org/advocacy/
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agencies a memorandum arguing potential criminal liability of those sta-
tions for illegal operations. 
Perhaps the TLP’s most significant accomplishments to date involve its 
work against the Palestinian/international movement for boycotts, divest-
ment, and sanctions (BDS). The Palestinian BDS movement commenced in 
an organized and concerted fashion in 2005, one year after the International 
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion finding the Israeli separation wall 
being built in Palestinian territory to be in violation of international law and 
ordering its dismantlement. No effective action had been taken by any govern-
ment to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, thus the BDS movement called for in-
ternational solidarity among citizens of the world in support of rights of Pales-
tinians to freedom, justice, and equality.15 In recent years the BDS movement 
has gained significant support among unions, professional associations, and 
student groups in Europe and the United States, and has been cited by Israeli 
authorities as a “strategic threat” and part of an effort to “delegitimize” Israel.
Along with other allies, The Lawfare Project has mounted campaigns 
in most of the fifty U.S. states and has persuaded some 26 to issue legislation 
or executive orders barring BDS. Like its efforts against Kuwait Airways, the 
legislation that TLP has supported has been framed in terms of anti-discrim-
ination law. For example, a law currently winding its way through the Cal-
ifornia state legislature would require any bid for a public state contract to 
certify that it does not engage in any unlawful discrimination under existing 
California civil rights law under threat of criminal prosecution. The refer-
ence is to the same body of law that was adopted originally to combat racial 
discrimination against African Americans, Latino Americans, and others.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
To recap what we have catalogued here of the legal efforts of pro-Israeli 
forces, we have seen: 1) the use of international humanitarian law to expand 
the scope of violence against civilians; 2) the application of human rights 
15 https://bdsmovement.net/
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law, environmental law, and other bodies of substantive law to advance Isra-
el’s colonization of the West Bank; 3) the exploitation of procedural devices 
such as extraterritorial jurisdiction and class action suits used to attack Pal-
estinian institutions; 4) organizational form and other technical aspects of 
human rights documentation mirrored by Israeli settlers; 5) the deployment 
of anti-discrimination principles in the attempt to defeat peaceful forms of 
Palestinian resistance to oppression; and 6) all to significantly greater impact 
than virtually anything the Palestinians or their supporters have been able 
to achieve in the legal sphere.
What does this all mean? What are we to make of this? 
One strongly suggested conclusion here – which may seem obvious – is 
that it is much easier for groups in civil society to sail with the winds of cur-
rent power and state authority than it is to sail against them. Consider Re-
gavim: surely, it has differences with Israeli authorities over how to colonize 
Palestinian lands, but the fact of colonization has been clearly supported by 
all Israeli governments since 1967. Shurat Hadin, meanwhile, makes explicit 
its coordination with Israeli government, for example, in its recent $1 billion 
lawsuit against Facebook for allegedly providing material support to Pales-
tinian groups attacking American citizens.16
What is also strongly suggested, however, is that there is very little 
leverage in substantive or procedural law itself that the relatively powerless 
can mobilize to their benefit. While we are all probably accustomed to think-
ing of law as an instrument of power, some of us may have been comforted 
ourselves in thinking that there were corners of law, or pockets of law, that 
were “ours” – that were specifically for challenges to power by the powerless. 
In this case, Israel/Palestine, that seems not to be the case, as we see have 
seen these areas of refuge within the law turned against us – whether in con-
sumer protection law or class action suits, both devices originally legislated 
to empower individuals to effectively confront mistreatment at the hands of 
16 See https://972mag.com/israeli-government-lawfare-contractor-sues-facebook-for-1b/120621/
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large corporations, or anti-discrimination law devised to assist persecuted 
minorities achieve equality and justice, or principles of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction generated to apprehend and punish international war criminals.
Far more thought and analysis is due before firm conclusions can be 
drawn, still less any prescription for peoples seeking justice against over-
whelming power in places other than Israel/Palestine. But one expression 
comes to mind: “Don’t poke a sleeping beast with a short stick!” In calling 
for “more law,” as some Palestinians, including this author, have, over time, 
we have now gotten what we asked for – but in a far less favorable form than 
we had hoped. 
Our mistake may have been to trust a law disembodied from politics – 
to imagine that law could compensate for political weakness. What we now 
may be learning is that there are no shortcuts for the powerless – law will not 
be our refuge – and our legal victories, if we ever achieve them, will only de-
velop as we build political muscle through long and arduous struggle outside 
the legal system. In other words, courts will rule for us only when they must. 
